How do states in the Global South manage cross-border migration? This article identifies Hollifield's "migration state" as a useful tool for comparative analysis yet notes that in its current version the concept is limited, given its focus on economic immigration in advanced liberal democracies. We suggest a framework for extending the "migration state" concept by introducing a typology of nationalizing, developmental, and neoliberal migration management regimes. The article explains each type and provides illustrative examples drawn from a range of case studies. To conclude, it discusses the implications of this analysis for comparative migration research, including the additional light it sheds on the migration management policies of states in the Global North.
Introduction
As the international politics of cross-border mobility becomes more complex, there is a growing need to comprehend the evolution and rationale behind a variety of state migration management practices. Yet, the field of migration studies lacks an adequate comparative framework for understanding the emergence of different forms of state migration management regimes outside the Global North. Non-Western countries have experienced trajectories of state formation and development that may differ from those of industrial "northern" democracies and that are often shaped by factors beyond the state, including colonial legacies (Klotz 2013; Cooper 2014) , regional dynamics (Thiollet 2011; Tsourapas 2016; Geddes et al. 2019) , external actors (FitzGerald and Cook-Martín 2014), and international systemic-level factors (Adamson 2006; Adamson and Tsourapas 2019) . The relationship between migration and processes such as postcolonial state formation, nation-building, developmentalism, and structural dependency has not regularly featured in theories of migration that emerged from the study of countries in post-1945 Europe and North America. 1 Yet, as we demonstrate here, such factors are crucial to understanding state migration management regimes in much of the world.
In this article, we seek to better understand state models of migration management in the Global South. We do so by beginning with the key concept of the "migration state," as developed by Hollifield (2004) , which has been central to migration studies (e.g., Castles 2004; Boswell 2007; Freeman and Kessler 2008; Hampshire 2013; Peters 2017) . We suggest that this concept's extension to regions beyond Europe and North America can help shed light on variations in state approaches to cross-border mobility across time and space. Taking inspiration from the political economy literature on varieties of state capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001) , we examine variations in migration management regimes by presenting a typology of state policies derived from the broader literatures on state formation and the international political economy of development. 2 As a starting point, we propose characterizing state migration management regimes by the extent to which they are nationalizing, developmental, or neoliberal. Our aim in doing so is not to produce a 1 Scholars such as Brubaker (1992) , Hansen (2000) , Triadafilopoulos (2004) , and Zolberg (2006b) have taken an historical approach to migration and nation-building but have focused, respectively, on France and Germany, Britain, Canada, and the United States. The literature on colonial legacies, nation-building, and citizenship in the Global South, such as Chatterjee (1993) or Mamdami (2018), has not been well integrated into migration studies and has not focused on migration per se. More recently, however, migration histories of cases such as South Africa (Klotz 2013) and India (Mongia 2018 ) have begun to bridge this gap. 2 The literature in this area is vast, but on state formation and nation-building, see Smith (1986) ; Barkey and Parikh (1991) ; Vu (2010) ; Wimmer and Feinstein (2010) ; and Mylonas (2012) . On the international political economy of the Global South, see Amin (1976) ; Hout (1993) ; Bates (2001) ; and Haggard (2018) .
comprehensive typology of state migration regimes but rather to suggest ways of expanding the concept of the "migration state" beyond its liberal democratic variant in which migration management has been closely connected with broader state policy orientations toward markets and rights (Hollifield 2004) . We aim to show that Hollifield's concept of the "migration state" is historically and temporally bound and, for this reason, needs amending in order to achieve a more global applicability. Our article proceeds in the following manner. First, we discuss the need for appropriate frameworks for conducting global, comparative, and cross-regional research on state migration management policies. We note that much of the existing literature on migration and citizenship policy has emerged from studies of Europe and North America. Therefore, it has been shaped by a bias toward liberal democratic states, and its findings are not always easily transferable to other contexts. This bias, we argue, has been compounded by a bifurcation of the field into "migration" and "refugee" studies, with the latter more focused on the Global South. Second, we introduce Hollifield's concept of the "migration state" and assess its utility for undertaking global and comparative research. By recognizing that Hollifield's "migration state" is in actuality the liberal immigration state, we establish a space for identifying and analyzing other types of migration states. Third, we propose three additional types of migration states: nationalizing, developmental, and neoliberal. These three types, we suggest, allow for a more comprehensive understanding of trajectories of state migration management policies outside the Global North. After explaining what we mean by each type and providing illustrative examples drawn from a range of case studies, we discuss the implications of our analysis for comparative migration research, including the additional light it sheds on the migration management policies of states in the Global North.
The Politics of State Migration Management
The field of migration studies has approached questions of cross-border mobility management through a predominantly Western European and North American lens (Natter 2018) . This bias is reflected in the division of the field into "migration studies"-primarily focused on economic and labor immigration in the Global North -and "refugee studies" -principally concerned with forced displacement in the Global South. This bifurcation has resulted in, and has been reproduced through, separate journals and distinct debates around migrants and refugees (Black 2001) . It has also contributed to a de facto split between a migration-studies literature focused on issues of economic migration, citizenship, rights, and integration in "northern" democracies and a refugee-studies literature centered on humanitarian crises, mass population flows, and security issues in "southern" non-democracies (Betts and Loescher 2010; Milner 2014) .
For example, scholarship on citizenship and integration has focused disproportionately on Europe and North America, with comparisons of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom examining factors like national culture and identity (Brubaker 1992; Joppke 2010; Alba and Foner 2015) . Studies of migration policies and politics across OECD countries have also focused on states' economic interests in fostering labor immigration, immigrants' impact on welfare state systems, and state regimes' ability to secure the rights of immigrants and their descendants (Hollifield 1992 (Hollifield , 2004 Freeman 1995; Ruhs 2013) . Increasingly, there has also been scholarly attention to migration and asylum policy within the European Union (EU), focusing on issues such as Brussels's role in promoting policy harmonization across state actors; elites' and professionals' free movement within Europe; and the coordination of national approaches to immigration and asylum issues via burden-sharing (Thielemann 2003; Boswell and Geddes 2010; Favell 2011; Geddes and Scholten 2016) . Overall, then, there has been a strong tendency in migration studies "to focus on the consequences of immigration in wealthy, migrant-receiving societies, and to ignore the causes and consequences of migration in countries of origin within the Global South" (Castles, Miller, and De Haas 2014, 26) .
On the other hand, the field of refugee studies has tended to pay more attention to security, conflict, and humanitarian responses to crisis. For example, a number of studies have examined how refugee crises can play a role in the diffusion of conflicts across borders or lead to governance challenges in weak states (Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo 1992; Weiner and Russell 2001; Lischer 2005; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006) . Others have analyzed the humanitarian dimensions of forced migrations, including the management of refugee camps, the plight of stateless peoples, and the economic life of refugees (Jacobsen 2005; Betts et al. 2017) . Much of this scholarship has also focused on the international refugee regime's legal and political dimensions and treated migration flows in the Global South less as matters of state policy and more as matters of "global governance" (Barnett 2002; Betts 2011; Loescher and Milner 2011) . Here, the focal point remains on the failure of states and populations in the Global North to adequately respond to and manage refugee crises, rather than on the study of policymaking and migration management in southern states. Indeed, with notable exceptions (Jacobsen 1996 (Jacobsen , 2002 , states in the Global South are often missing or lack agency in this literature, relegated to the backdrop on which refugee crises unfold, the passive recipients of international aid, or victims of the policies of more powerful Northern states (Barnett 2001; Betts and Collier 2017) . This is not to say that there has been no attention to migration management outside Europe and North America. For example, one strand of literature has grown out of the study of diaspora politics and evolved from theorizing how migration affects sending states and origin-country politics (e.g., Heisler 1985; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; Kapur 2010; Margheritis 2015) to how sending states themselves attempt to manage and control emigration, expatriates, diasporas, and citizens abroad (Brand 2006; Adamson and Demetriou 2007; FitzGerald 2009; Varadarajan 2010; Naujoks 2013; Délano and Gamlen 2014; Margheritis 2015) . Working from a political sociology perspective, a second group of scholars has highlighted the importance of migration in non-OECD states' foreign policies (Klotz 2000; Curley and Wong 2008; Thiollet 2011) . In addition, a strand of literature examines citizenship and membership regimes across the Global South (Whitaker 2005; Sadiq 2008; Chung 2010a; Kim 2016) . There is also a range of important work on labor migrants' role in the politics and economies of the Arab world (Chaudhry 1997; Chalcraft 2009 ); policymaking in South Africa (Klotz 2013) , Latin America (Arcarazo & Freier 2015) , and Asia (Lie 2008; Chung 2010b ); and regional migration systems in Asia and elsewhere (McKeown 2008 ; see also sections of various collections, e.g., Castles, Miller, and De Haas 2014; Geddes et al. 2019) . Finally, there is an emerging literature on "South-South migration" which focuses on transit and host states in the Global South in an effort to move beyond conventional expectations of migration from poorer to richer countries in Europe and North America (Nawyn 2016; Short, Hossain, and Khan 2017; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2018) .
Despite this growing scholarly interest in migration across the Global South, we still lack a systematic comparative treatment of the politics of state migration management that includes states outside Europe and North America (Boucher and Gest 2018, 22-24) . Mainstream migration studies has relied on particular assumptions regarding state structures, interests, and regime types that are derived from the experiences of states in the Global North and that are not always applicable to countries with political systems and histories that differ from those of (post)industrial liberal democracies. In the following two sections, we propose a framework for analyzing migration in the Global South by utilizing Hollifield's (2004) concept of the "migration state" as a starting point. We argue that the "migration state" has become a shorthand for analyzing the policies of what should more accurately be understood as the liberal immigration state. Expanding the "migration state" concept to include other varieties of migration management regimes beyond those of liberal democratic states enhances its analytic utility and makes it more suitable for cross-regional (and transhistorical) comparisons.
The "Migration State" Concept and Its Limits
The notion of the "migration state" is key for understanding the central role that international migration management plays in the strategies and policies of contemporary states. Building on earlier notions of the "Garrison State" (Lasswell 1941) and the "Trading State" (Rosecrance 1986 ), the concept, as developed by James F. Hollifield (2004) , sheds light on the fact that the management of flows of people across state borders is as important to contemporary states as the management of violence or trade. Central to the migration state is the idea of the "liberal paradox." On the one hand, states must respond to liberalism's economic logic, which encourages trade and the free flows of goods across borders. On the other hand, liberalism's political and legal logics are of territorial and juridical closure. This situation leads to a tension in migration policymaking in which states seek to balance the logic of markets and the logic of rights (Hollifield 2004, 886-87) .
The "migration state" concept has been particularly fruitful in pointing out the central role that migration management plays in contemporary state policy and in understanding the contradictory interests facing states in managing migration flows. Yet, as currently employed, it is not fully portable to many contexts in the Global South because its underlying assumptions are biased toward the experience of liberal democratic states in post-1945 Europe and North America. In particular, the concept suffers from four biases that limit its conceptual portability: two related to the type of migration flows assumed by the model -an immigration bias and an economic migration bias -and two related to the type of state assumed by the model -a state capacity bias and a liberal bias. In other words, the framework focuses predominantly on a narrow subset of migration flows, states, and regime types and, therefore, is not comprehensive in its approach to global migration governance.
Immigration Bias
In terms of an immigration bias, Hollifield's "migration state" concept centers on state management of migrant flows into a destination country and, thus, examines policymaking around questions of entry, integration, citizenship, and naturalization. Due to the need for labor in post-1945 Europe and North America, the regulation of economically driven immigration has indeed been the greatest policy concern for many states in the Global North (Castles et al. 2014, 96-123) . 3 However, immigration is only one possible facet of migration policymaking, which can also include the management of emigration and its consequences, including state management of remittance flows, state diaspora engagement and diaspora management policies, as well as circular and transit migrations (Mylonas 2013; Gamlen 2014; Ragazzi 2014; Adamson 2019) .
For many states in the Global South, the management of out-migration as a strategy of economic development to both alleviate unemployment and secure foreign direct investment via remittances has been more salient than managing inmigration. For example, the Philippines, Mexico, and India are heavily reliant on labor exports and have incentives to devise policies that harness emigration's potential (FitzGerald 2009; Kapur 2010; Délano 2011; Naujoks 2013; Ireland 2018 ). Hollifield's model focuses on the management of immigration, rather than emigration, processes, making the framework more applicable to receiving states than to sending or transit states. Of course, in reality, no state is purely a migrationreceiving or -sending state; these are ideal types. Nonetheless, due to broader patterns of unequal economic and political development in the post-1945 period, the focus on the politics surrounding immigration, at the expense of emigration, has meant that the "migration state" concept has been less applicable to the political realities of labor-exporting states in the Global South.
Economic Bias
Additionally, the migration state model focuses on economic migration, with a particular emphasis on voluntary labor migration and the interaction between the flow of human labor across borders with economic markets and human rights. 4 Hollifield's model has paid far less attention to how states manage various forms of political and forced migration, including conflict-induced migration, ethnic cleansing, refugee crises, asylum-seeking, modern and historical forms of slavery, human trafficking, and smuggling. Here again, the focus on economic migration makes sense in the context of post-1945 states in the Global North, which experienced a period of relative stability and economic growth that acted as pull factors for both low-and high-skilled labor (Martin 1991; Hollifield et al. 2014, 3-35) .
The geographies of North America and Western Europe, as well as their geopolitical position in the post-WWII order, meant that such states were relatively removed from conflict zones (Zolberg et al. 1992; Loescher 1993) . Large refugee inflows, such as the Vietnamese to the United States in the 1970s and 1980s following the US withdrawal from Vietnam, were managed via specific legislationin this case, the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 (Bloemraad 2006) . While the United States did not distinguish between economic migrants and refugees prior to 1945, the policy of non-differentiation changed following WWII, with a number of legislative acts (e.g., the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, and the Refugee-Escapee Act of 1957) that culminated in the Refugee Act of 1980, which amended the Immigration and Nationality Acts of 1965 (Zolberg 2006b, 337ff) . Nevertheless, even though the United States has taken in large numbers of refugees, the annual number pales in comparison to that of economic migrants (Martin 2011). 5 Similarly, in Europe, the Iron Curtain dividing Western and Eastern Europe meant that states such as Britain, France, and Germany were largely protected from the immediate effects of conflict-induced cross-border refugee flows and could respond to crises, such as the expulsion of Asians from Uganda in 1972, from a 4 For example, Hollifield (2004, 885) argues that the "rise in immigration is a function of market forces (demand-pull and supply-push), which reduce the transaction costs of moving from one society to another." This framing ignores migration forms that stem from conflict and political persecution (e.g., refugees and asylum-seekers), although Hollifield (2004, 892-93) does address the spike in refugees following WWI and WWII and notes migration's significance in "less-developed countries." 5 In September 2018, US President Donald Trump announced that the number of refugees resettled in the United States in 2019 would be capped at 30,000, further scaling back US responses to forced displacement (Davis 2018). distance. Europe's geographic isolation changed to some extent with the end of the Cold War and the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s, which resulted in massive refugee flows into the rest of Europe, including approximately 350,000 into Germany (Martinovic 2016). More recently, conflicts in Syria and elsewhere have led to substantial flows of refugees into Europe, yet the number of refugees entering Europe still pales in comparison to the numbers of refugees hosted by states such as Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan (Carrera et al. 2015; Ostrand 2015; Yazgan et al. 2015) . Thus, Hollifield's "migration state" model, which focuses on economic migration and the tradeoff between markets and rights, is insufficient for understanding state management of conflict-driven and forced migration.
State Capacity Bias
An additional bias in the "migration state" concept is its focus on advanced industrial (or postindustrial) countries with high levels of state capacity. The model rests largely on Westphalian assumptions about state sovereignty, which allow researchers to treat the state as a unitary rational actor with functioning policymaking and bureaucratic apparatuses, clearly defined national borders, and a coherent sense of national identity (Waltz 1979, 111-14; Hollifield 2004, 887-88) . However, many states in the world do not have these characteristics and suffer from low levels of state capacity, ongoing internal conflict, or compromised sovereignty. These factors may affect their ability to formulate and implement coherent and effective migration policies, hindering the applicability of Hollifield's model to weak states or states with low levels of juridical or Westphalian sovereignty (Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Migdal 1988; Krasner 1999) . Similarly, the migration state model assumes that states possess a basic capacity for policy formulation and implementation (Hollifield 2004, 893 ) -a problematic assumption for weak states with low capacity, which may lack the ability to implement policies or rely on more informal mechanisms of migration control or integration into the labor market. Indeed, the assumption that states can formulate and implement coherent migration policies does not fully hold in states with high capacity, either: European and North American states, for example, often lack the capacity or will to deter irregular migration or enforce workplace compliance (Castles 2004) . While this situation may sometimes be related to the so-called "migration gap" between the rhetoric surrounding migration policy and the actual policies and their enforcement (Hollifield, Martin, and Orrenius 2014) , this problem can be more severe in states with low internal capacity. For example, in both India and Malaysia, low state capacity to register and document indigenous births, combined with the availability of counterfeit documentation for recent migrants, leads to the counterintuitive outcome of some irregular migrants having more formal rights than some native-born residents (Sadiq 2008) . Such practices suggest that the migration state model's underlying assumptions regarding a state's capacity to formulate and implement policy pose yet another barrier to its portability to a variety of contexts in the Global South.
Liberal Bias
Finally, the migration state model has largely been derived from, and applied to, states with liberal democratic regime types and market economies rhetorically committed to individual rights (Natter 2018 ). Hollifield's work, for example, focuses explicitly on the migration policies of "advanced industrial democracies" -largely, the United States, France, and Germany. 6 Within this context, states face a "liberal paradox" with respect to migration policy -they must devise policies that allow states to capture the benefits of global markets while still protecting individual rights (Hollifield 2004, 886-87 ). Yet, not all states have liberal regime types or prioritize markets and rights (Chung et al. 2018) . Thus, the migration state model, in its current form, has limited applicability to states across a variety of non-liberal regime types, such as illiberal democracies, authoritarian regimes, autocracies, and anocracies, which may have policy goals or political systems that diverge from those of states in Western Europe and North America and may not be beholden to liberal norms.
For example, developing states' migration policy in much of the post-WWII era has centered on the prevention of "brain drain" via restrictive emigration practices (Hirschman 1978, 101) . The Eastern European communist bloc focused on preventing emigration to the West while supporting the circulation of skilled migrants across the communist world, as per the ideals of socialist internationalism (Applebaum 2019). Many states in the Global South, including Gulf Cooperation Council states and Central Asian republics, have programs that encourage their citizens to study internationally but also prevent them from migrating permanently by tying them to a commitment to return following study (Perna et al. 2014; Del Sordi 2017) . Some autocratic regimes continue to consider migration a politically suspect act and try to prevent citizens' freedom to travel via a number of means (Alemán and Woods 2014) . Moreover, liberal norms can be used for exclusionary and identarian purposes, leading to deep contradictions around migration even within liberal states (Adamson et al. 2011) .
The desire to procure material gains via emigration often contrasts with nondemocracies' desire to politically control their citizens within the nation-state's borders (Alemán and Woods 2014) . In line with Hollifield's argument that liberal democracies are characterized by a liberal paradox, non-democratic migration states in the Global South frequently face an illiberal paradox (Tsourapas 2019a ): on the one hand, they seek to restrict emigration for political and security reasons; on the other hand, they need to encourage emigration for economic reasons to attract remittances, tackle structural problems of unemployment and overpopulation, or reap other material benefits associated with cross-border mobility (Mosley and Singer 2015) . A number of Global South states respond to this illiberal paradox by restricting emigration: at times, Cuba, Uzbekistan, North Korea, and Soviet bloc states have imposed firm control on citizens' emigration, prioritizing political repression over material gain (Dowty, 1989) . For China, it was only during the post-1978 period of "reform and opening up" that the ruling Communist Party agreed to relax its restrictive emigration laws (Liu 2009 ). Other developmental migration states' response to the illiberal paradox is to encourage emigration but to attempt to control political activism abroad: Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia encouraged their citizens' emigration for economic reasons but also developed intricate mechanisms of monitoring and controlling citizens' behavior abroad (Brand 2006) . Eritrea, with one third of its citizens residing outside the country, has established coercive transnational institutions to ensure continuous inflows of remittances and tax income (Hirt and Mohammad 2017) . Broadly, then, non-democracies that allow, and benefit economically from, citizens' cross-border mobility tend to also develop intricate "extraterritorial authoritarian practices" that aim to "manage and offset the risks population mobility poses to them" (Glasius 2018, 179) .
These four biases -an immigration bias; an economic migration bias; a state capacity bias; and a liberal bias -all point to the limitations of the existing migration state model, which has emerged inductively from the study of migration management policies in the Global North. Although the four characteristics converge in post-1945 states in Western Europe and North America, there are many examples of states that represent only some or none of these characteristics. For example, India is a liberal democratic state with weak capacity to manage and implement formal migration systems (Sadiq 2008) ; Mexico, which successfully implemented liberal democratic practices only recently, has historically managed not only immigration but also emigration and transit migrant flows (FitzGerald 2009). Therefore, we argue, it is useful to further unpack the notion of the migration state in ways that extend its relevance to other settings and contexts. Just as the "varieties of capitalism" literature has observed that state management of relations between labor and capital varies across states to include both liberal and coordinated market economies (Hall and Soskice 2001) , so too is there significant variation across states in their migration management regimes.
Varieties of Migration States: Nationalizing, Developmental, and Neoliberal
Based on the above discussion, we can see that the "migration state" concept refers, in actuality, to a relatively narrow set of migration management regimes that may be best understood as those of immigration policies for economic migrants in advanced liberal democracies. In other words, the migration state, as it has been used, should be more accurately understood as the liberal immigration state. As a means of strengthening the concept's applicability across time and space, we extend it to a variety of state migration management regimes that would be more applicable to contexts in the Global South.
We propose that the categories of nationalizing, developmental, and neoliberal migration states provide a framework for applying the migration state concept to a greater range of historical and geographical cases. The categories recognize the need to look historically at processes of state formation and development, while considering broader structural trends and international factors, such as changing global relations between capital and labor, that shape state choices (Basch, Schiller, and Blanc 2005; Peters 2017) . 7 The three categories are derived from both inductive and deductive reasoning, drawing on a combination of the literatures on nation-building, developmentalism, and neoliberalism and from our critique of the migration state framework. As such, we propose these models as an exercise in grounded theory (Strauss and Corbin 1997; Glaser 2017) , with the aim of producing new categories. In the remainder of this article, we illustrate the categories' logic by using a range of examples to show their broader applicability.
All three of these additional varieties of migration states pose challenges to Hollifield's liberal migration state because their migration policies and practices are not guided by concerns with trade-offs between markets and rights. Furthermore, the nationalizing migration state poses a challenge to the dominance of economic and market concerns as motivating factors for state migration policies, highlighting instead the political and ideological roots of state migration policy and the prevalence of state-driven instances of forced displacement. In the case of the developmental migration state, the model challenges the overwhelming focus on immigration by pointing to the important role of emigration and labor export in the economic development strategies of democratic and non-democratic states in the Global South. Finally, the neoliberal migration state calls into question the centrality of rights-based migration policymaking and demonstrates how variations in state capacity (and autonomy) lead to differences in how states commodify cross-border migration flows. More broadly, the policies of these three types of "migration states" emerge not just from domestic politics and preferences but are embedded in broader structural and international trends, such as imperial collapse and decolonization; ideologies of developmentalism; and the global rise of deregulation and commodification, all of which are closely associated with a number of international actors, such as powerful "Northern" states and international organizations.
Furthermore, these three forms of migration states are meant to be ideal typesin the Weberian sense -and are designed to be indicative (rather than exhaustive) of the alternative logics that might drive state migration policy across a range of cases. As such, they should be treated as heuristic tools that help contextualize and illuminate underlying logics of state migration policies across different contexts. In reality, the categories may overlap or merge into one another, and any particular state may have contradictory policies that correspond to particular aspects of one or more ideal type. With these caveats, the rest of this section outlines and illustrates these three additional types of "migration states." Nationalizing Migration States: Population Exchanges, Expulsions, and Ethnic "Return"
The concept of the state that informs Hollifield's migration state is the modern sovereign nation-state, defined by clear boundaries and a national identity -the same model that pervades much of the mainstream literature in international relations and political science (Agnew 1994 ). While this model may be suited to understanding many aspects of policymaking in post-1945 industrial democracies, it sidesteps the fact that the vast majority of the world's states came into existence after 1945. 8 Migration studies has undertheorized the role that population movement and control in general, and policies of forced migration in particular, have played in larger processes of state formation and nation-building, especially in postcolonial and postimperial contexts (Zolberg 1983; Klotz 2013) . State-and nation-building processes have been responsible for significant human population flows during the twentieth century and need to be understood as a subcategory of state migration management policies. The ideology of nationalism, and the political impetus "to make a state correspond to a nation," shaped postcolonial and postimperial statebuilding around the world and in different contexts (Cooper 2018, 95) . In nationalizing migration states, the dominant logic is identity based and politically driven, rather than one of markets and rights.
One of the most spectacular examples of the use of mass migrations in the formation of new states occurred with the 1947 partition of British India into the newly formed states of India and Pakistan. An estimated 10-12 million refugees were created, with around 7,226,000 Muslims moving to Pakistan and approximately 7,249,000 Hindus and Sikhs crossing from Pakistan to India (Talbot and Singh 2009) . A further partition of Pakistan in the context of the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War led to an additional outflow of 10 million Bengali refugees to neighboring India (Totten and Bartrop 2008) .
Earlier in the twentieth century, the Ottoman Empire engaged in population exchanges with Bulgaria and Greece in 1913 and 1914, respectively. In addition time, approximately 350,000 people were forced to move between Greece and Bulgaria as part of a 1919 bilateral agreement (Içduygu and Sert 2015; Robson 2017, 73) . More broadly, the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the modern Turkish Republic can be characterized as a period of nation-building via the state management of forced migration, including population exchanges, expulsions, and ethnic cleansing (Yildirim 2007) . Some of these expulsions predate the emergence of modern Turkey -most famously, the Armenian expulsions between 1915 and 1917 and smaller population transfers of Armenians to Syria and Lebanon in 1921-22 (Robson 2017, 78) . The founding of the new Turkish Republic, however, saw rounds of deportations in the form of the 1923 Greek-Turkish population exchange, in which 1.2 million Christian "Greeks" in Anatolia were denationalized and exchanged for 350,000 Muslim "Turks" from Greece (Triadafilopoulos 1998; Hirschon 2003) . At the same time, immigration policies in the early Republican period promoted the development of an ethno-religiously defined Turkish identity, encouraging the arrival of over 700,000 Muslims from various Balkan states, including Greece, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria (Akgündüz 1998; Kirişci 2000) . The transition from empire to nation-state, thus, involved the establishment of a migration management regime based on the homogenization of a population within clearly defined territorial borders.
Further examples of the mass expulsion of populations during processes of stateformation and nation-building in the Middle East include the approximately 750,000 Palestinians expelled in 1948 with the founding of the state of Israel -a process that was legitimized in part by the example of "nation-building exchanges such as the postwar expulsion of Germans from Poland and Czechoslovakia" (Robson 2017, 133-34) . Throughout the twentieth century, most of these flows were managed by newly formed states, sometimes with the assistance of international actors, such as the Mandatory Powers of the League of Nations, which viewed the "unmixing" of populations "as a legitimate, internationally sanctioned form of state building" (Robson 2017, 74) . The exodus of approximately 800,000 French citizens from Algeria in 1961-62 followed the Algerian War of Liberation (McDougall 2017, 221) . In addition, there were multiple cases of the expulsion or mass exodus of approximately 850,000 Jewish residents from Arab states in the 1950s through 1970s during periods of Arabization that accompanied postcolonial state-building processes (Cohen 1973) . The reshaping of the Arab Middle East along ethnic lines also led to the expulsion of other minorities (Sharkey 2017) . For example, the introduction of nationalization policies by Egypt's Nasserite regime, particularly the 1957 Egyptianization Laws, contributed to the decline of the country's European communities; by the time of Nasser's death in 1970, Egypt's once-thriving Greek and Italian communities were almost non-existent (Kazamias 2009; Gorman 2015 ). The regional dynamics of the Arab-Israeli conflict also marked the end of Egypt's thriving Jewish community (Laskier 1992) , as a community of over 80,000 in 1948 was reduced to six elderly women by 2016 (AFP 2017).
Similar processes took place in other cases of decolonization. At the end of the Portuguese empire in the 1970s, approximately 500,000 European retornados "returned" to Portugal, despite never having lived there (Lewis and Williams 1985) . Around 90,000 Europeans left the Congo for Belgium in 1960 (Stanard 2018) . 9 Nationalizing processes in Uganda under Idi Amin led to the mass expulsion of approximately 80,000 citizens and residents of South Asian descent in 1972 (Adams and Bristow 1979) . Population expulsions and returns also formed key components of post-imperial nation-building in Japan, where the ethnically Korean population was forcibly repatriated to Korea after WWII (Morris-Suzuki 2007; Ryang 2013) .
Forced expulsions, population exchanges, and refugee flows are not usually studied as migration policy and are instead framed as ethnic cleansing or genocide (Brubaker 1998) . Nevertheless, if migration is defined as the movement of people across borders, these types of mobility constitute significant examples of statedriven forms of migration, particularly throughout the twentieth century. In these cases, migration policy has not primarily been used as a tool of economic development or a means of filling gaps in the labor market, but rather as a means of forcibly constituting national populations in an attempt to create ethno-religious homogeneity (Rae 2002; Vigneswaran 2013) .
The Developmental Migration State: Labor Emigration and Remittances
The migration state model, as applied to North America and Europe, has assumed that advanced industrial states rely on immigration as part of a strategy of economic growth -past labor shortages in Europe and the United States have encouraged the recruitment of both high-and low-skilled foreign labor. Yet, the relationship between cross-border mobility and economic growth is demonstrably different in many states of the Global South, which have adopted developmental strategies that rely heavily on labor export via emigration. This interplay between migration management and development has been examined under the framework of "brain gain" and, most prominently, economic remittances (Castles, Miller, and De Haas 2014, 75-83) . Research has long established the importance of capital inflows for sending states, particularly in the Global South (Orrenius and Zavodny 2012; Escribà-Folch, Meseguer, and Wright 2015; Mosley and Singer 2015) . Migrant remittances constitute a source of foreign exchange and produce multiplier effects on the aggregate economy (Kapur 2010) , while decreasing demand for social spending (Doyle 2015) . In 2018 alone, the World Bank estimated official migrant remittances to low-and middle-income countries to have reached a record high of US$529 billion; from 2019, remittances are expected to become these countries' largest source of external funding (World Bank 2019). Numerous states of the Global South also encourage citizens' pursuit of education and training opportunities abroad as part of their modernization or industrialization strategies (Guruz 2011) . A key strategy of developmental migration states involves the use of migration management as a "safety valve," encouraging an outflow of (excess) domestic labor, with the aim of reducing labor surpluses and easing accompanying sociopolitical and economic pressures (Appleyard 1989) .
In the 1960s and 1970s, Turkey, for example, used labor emigration as a means of reducing unemployment and increasing foreign exchange reserves through remittances, which were also used to keep the Turkish lira's value artificially high (Martin 1991) . Additionally, Turkish migration policy was viewed as a way of ensuring that rural migrant workers acquired new skills and training that could be tapped upon their return, when they would bring foreign capital to invest in their local communities (Sayari 1986, 92-93) . A similar developmental rationale governed the migration state in North Africa: Tunisia and Morocco identified powerful economic incentives in promoting labor emigration to Western Europe, primarily to tackle high unemployment and attract remittances (Brand 2006, 17) . The Libyan migration state under Colonel Gaddafi expected gains in human capital, offering scholarships to promote student mobility and encourage citizens' training abroad (Tsourapas 2019a) .
Between 1942 and 1964, the Mexican developmental migration state negotiated the outflow of Mexican labor into the United States under the auspices of the Bracero Program, which was designed "to trade a pool of unemployed laborers for a source of remittances and modernizing influences" (FitzGerald 2009, 48) . Following the Bracero program's end, the Mexican state continued to encourage emigration as "an economic escape valve" and designed initiatives such as the "Tres-por-Uno" (3x1) matching funds program to encourage emigrant investment in local development schemes (ibid., 57-58). The Philippines is perhaps the emblematic country that has used emigration as an explicit developmental strategy, sending approximately 800,000 citizens abroad annually on temporary labor contracts and developing elaborate governance structures to liaise with and protect the rights of its diaspora (Tyner 2004; Ireland 2018) . Like other East Asian states in the 1970s, such as South Korea, the Philippines followed a developmental state model, while explicitly focusing on emigration's role in strengthening the national economy: it established an official "overseas employment program" in 1974, with basic regulatory institutions, and, by 2009, the Philippines was receiving over US$19 billion per year just from overseas female workers (Ireland 2018, 325-327) . A similar strategy of harnessing emigration's power as a development tool has been used by a number of African states. For example, Cameroon has received tens of millions of US dollars annually from its diaspora since the 1990s, including an estimated $244 million in 2016, and the Cameroonian diaspora or "bushfallers" have played a crucial role in development there (Ollong 2013; Malit and Alexander 2017) .
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan, as well as poorer Arab states such as Egypt, traditionally promoted labor migration to the oil-producing Arab states not solely to attract remittances but also to curb overpopulation and unemployment (Weiner 1985; Kapur 2010; Tsourapas 2018) . In 2018, 29.1 million foreign nationals resided across the Gulf Cooperation Council states, constituting 51.9 percent of the six oil-producing states' total population. 10 Developmental migration states have created numerous instruments to regulate economically driven mobility, including bilateral and multilateral treaties (Fargues and Shah 2018) . In 2015, the Indian Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs developed "e-Migrate," an online database which aimed to increase transparency and enhance labor protection by registering and inspecting foreign companies that recruit Indians abroad. 11 Thus, for developmental migration states reliant on remittances, the management of labor emigration and the resulting transnational diaspora populations constitute a key element of the "migration state" (Gamlen 2008; Adamson 2016) .
The Neoliberal Migration State: Capitalizing on Cross-Border Mobility
The migration state model rests on the assumption that states have a degree of capacity and autonomy to independently formulate and develop their migration policy. For advanced liberal democracies, globalization has created economic incentives for practices such as outsourcing manufacturing to countries with lower labor and regulatory costs (Peters 2017) . Just as state economies in the Global North have become transnational, however, so has the migration policy of Global South states. Increasingly, states have an incentive to capitalize on cross-border mobility, treating both voluntary and forced migration as a commodity that can be utilized to enhance state revenue and power. While the developmental migration state aims to employ emigration policy as a means of exporting labor and relieving domestic socioeconomic pressures, the neoliberal migration state is more explicit in its monetization of migration flows. Two examples illustrate the workings of neoliberal migration states: the emergence of citizenship-by-investment schemes and the use of refugees and migrants as a means of extracting revenue from external bodies such as states or international organizations. In these two examples of neoliberal forms of migration management, states strategically use population mobility as a means of generating revenue.
In the first case of "citizenship-by-investment" schemes, states literally sell membership in their polity (Abrahamian 2015; Surak 2016) . The use of economic capital as a determining factor of membership in a political community constitutes a commodification of citizenship by states that have succumbed to the market's logic (Shachar and Hirschl 2014; Tanasoca 2016) . Citizenship-by-investment schemes represent the opposite end of the spectrum from the nationalizing migration state, as they "speak to the very arbitrariness of the concept of belonging to a nation to begin with" (Abrahamian 2015, 154) . Under this arrangement, modern citizenship is shaped by "universalizing [and contending] criteria of neoliberalism and human rights" (Ong 2006, 499) , within the context of a broader neoliberal shift toward the "contractualization of citizenship" by states that hold the "market value [to be] the chief criterion for membership" (Somers 2008, 5) . Citizenship-by-investment schemes reshape the link between citizenship and rights that defined Hollifield's liberal migration state model. They are manifestations of the commodification of rights and the transformation of states into entrepreneurial actors in which belonging is redefined in neoliberal terms (Brown 2015; Surak 2019) .
The proliferation of "citizenship-by-investment" schemes can be partly explained by the revenue they generate for economies in the Global South. A number of Caribbean nations charge US$250,000 to provide visa-free access to Europe: in St. Kitts island, the citizenship-by-investment scheme "has brought about an economic miracle," with the sale of passports now constituting 25 percent of the country's GDP (Surak 2016, 39) . Since 2017, the Republic of Vanuatu has offered citizenship for US$150,000, promising "visa-free entry to 26 Schengen Area countries as well as UK, Russia, Hong Kong & Singapore." 12 The Vanuatu Information Centre promises that the approval process "takes between 30 to 60 days to complete, making it one of the fastest processing times in the World." 13 Cyprus's "golden passport" scheme has been running since 2013 and awards Cypriot (and European) citizenship for an individual investment of €2 million -a process not dissimilar from Malta's ongoing citizenship-by-investment scheme (Antoniou 2018) . In 2018, Turkey revised its national scheme (established in 2016), allowing foreigners to become citizens if they own property worth US$250,000 (Caglayan 2018) .
Beyond the commodification of citizenship, the neoliberal migration state also promotes the monetization of other forms of cross-border migration flows, such as forced migration. The increasing reluctance of states in the Global North to accept refugees has led to the emergence of strategies aimed at keeping forcibly displaced populations in the Global South, including providing material support to host states of first asylum (Loescher 1993; FitzGerald 2019) . Formalized via migration "deals" and refugee "compacts," the commodification of forced displacement encourages refugee rent-seeking behavior across Global South states, which seek to attract external economic support in order to continue hosting refugee populations within their borders (Tsourapas 2019b) .
The trend toward refugee rent-seeking behavior is particularly evident in the context of the Syrian refugee crisis: Turkey, which has come to host approximately 3 million displaced Syrians, successfully negotiated with the EU in 2015 and 2016 to receive approximately €6 billion in exchange for controlling emigration and keeping refugees in situ (Ö zden 2013; Içduygu 2015; Greenhill 2016; Sert and Yildiz 2016) . Jordan and Lebanon negotiated similar agreements, aimed at "turning the Syrian refugee crisis into a development opportunity" (Tsourapas 2019b, 7) . Between 2013 and 2014, the EU concluded a number of "Mobility Partnerships" with Morocco, Tunisia, and Jordan that offered certain perks to these states in return for securitizing irregular migration and refugee flows in the European periphery (Collyer 2012) .
These agreements followed the example of Spain's first Africa Plan, which saw the doubling of Spanish development aid to sub-Saharan Africa between 2006 and 2010 (Andersson 2014, 40-42) . Senegal, in this context, leveraged Spanish concern about irregular migration to secure a €20 million migration-linked development package in 2006 (ibid., 40-42) . Under Gaddafi, Libya obtained €2 billion from the EU in 2005 to prevent emigration to Europe (Greenhill 2010, 332) . On the other side of the world, the tiny island nation of Nauru in 2017-18 earned two-thirds of its entire US$170 million revenue from detaining and processing migrants for Australia in the form of "direct aid, resettlement and visa fees for refugees, fees to the Nauru Regional Processing Center Cooperation, or reimbursements to Nauru's government." 14 Between 2001 and 2007, Nauru, Manus and Christmas Island were able to leverage US$1 billion in revenue from Australia to host and process approximately 1,700 asylum-seekers, amounting to more than $500,000 per asylum seeker. 15 The trend of capitalizing on irregular migration and forced displacement for material gain in the Global South is, of course, directly related to Global North states' policies of externalizing and outsourcing migration management (Grewcock 2014; FitzGerald 2019) . 16 Thus, the proliferation of citizenship-by-investment schemes and the strategic use of cross-border migration flows as a means of generating revenue from external bodies point to the emergence of neoliberal forms of migration management.
Conclusions
In this article, we have suggested that the "migration state" concept is a useful tool for engaging in comparative analysis of state migration management policies across time and space. Yet, in its current usage, the concept has limited applicability, due to its focus on economically driven immigration in advanced liberal democracies. Our article proposes a means of extending Hollifield's (2004) Greenhill 2010, 329. 16 This situation can lead to perverse consequences, such as the creation of financial incentives for countries to inflate the numbers of refugees and migrants. See, for example, discussions of Uganda and Somalia in Okinor (2018) and Kibreab (2004) . emphasizes the use of cross-border mobility in nation-building processes, drawing attention to the political and ideological roots of state migration policies and the prevalence of state-led policies of forced migration. The developmental model points to the important role of emigration and labor export in the economic development strategies of many states around the world. The neoliberal model highlights how states monetize cross-border migration flows via citizenship-by-investment policies and the commodification of forced displacement. These migration state models are meant to be illustrative, rather than comprehensive, and to demonstrate how a critical engagement with, and extension of, the migration state concept can make it more applicable to cases across the Global South. Extending the migration state concept opens up new directions in comparative research on the state's role in shaping migration policy, including when and why particular states move between the categories of nationalizing, developmental and neoliberal, as well as the ways these categories relate to one another over time.
While our primary focus in this article has been on expanding the migration state concept in ways that make it more applicable to cases across the Global South, our proposed typology has additional advantages. To start with, it facilitates historical comparisons. Liberal migration states have also engaged in nationalizing practices of racial and ethnic exclusion, including the use of forced migration and displacement toward indigenous and other populations and via policies such as the US Chinese Exclusion Act and the White Australia Policy (Jupp 2002; Triadafilopoulos 2004; Zolberg 2006b; FitzGerald and Cook-Martín 2014) . European states relied heavily on emigration as part of their developmental practices and as a way of managing "surplus populations" in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries -long before they switched to importing labor after WWII (Zolberg 2006a) . Neoliberal practices of externalization and outsourcing of migration management to private entities, such as shipping companies, were prevalent in the late-19th and early-20th centuries (Zolberg 2003; Feys 2010) . Moreover, the instrumentalization of citizenship that is a feature of contemporary citizenship-by-investment schemes has affinities with ancient Roman models of citizenship that emphasized access to a set of goods rather than political belonging (Joppke 2018).
Equally important, this typology helps us better understand and engage the globally entangled nature of migration regimes. The nationalizing migration state in the Global South emerged in part due to systemic pressures emanating from Europe to adopt the national state model. Similarly, the developmental migration state, with its focus on emigration, is the mirror image of labor-receiving immigration states -all immigrants are also emigrants. Placing immigration and emigration models side by side allows us to see the relationship between migration and larger dynamics of economic dependence and structural inequality. The emergence of the neoliberal migration state can also be tied to larger dynamics of global inequality, in which migration restrictions in the Global North create global markets for passports via citizenship-by-investment schemes as well as incentives for states in the Global South to monetize refugees and other migrants.
Finally, the typology we offer here has relevance for understanding the emergence of illiberal forms of migration policy in both the Global North and South. The contemporary politicization of migration issues in countries such as Britain, the United States, and Hungary suggests the ongoing relevance of nationalizing impulses to the politics of migration in states in the Global North. The emergence of points-based migration systems in Canada and elsewhere to attract high-skilled workers in the context of the global knowledge economy can be seen as a developmental form of migration management; whereas outsourcing the management of irregular migration by states in the Global North to private detention firms and states beyond their borders shows the contemporary global prevalence of neoliberal forms of migration management. 17 Therefore, the need to expand the "migration state" concept beyond its liberal democratic variant may be increasingly necessary for understanding the evolving migration policies of states in North America and Europe, as well as states in the Global South. Especially amid the current global resurgence of populist nationalism, it is important to recognize that the contemporary "migration state" is not always a liberal democratic one.
